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BOOK REVIEWS
POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES. By WILLIAM L.
CARY. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1967. Pp. 149. $5.95.
When William Cary went to the SEC as Chairman in 1961, his background was primarily academic-professorships in law and business at
Columbia, Harvard, and Northwestern and numerous writings in the tax
and corporate fields'-but included active practice and Wall Street consulting as well as government service. When he left the SEC in 1964, he
had become an astute politician and political scientist as well.
This book is a distillation of experience and observation at the SEC. His
years as Chairman spanned the Kennedy and early Johnson presidencies,
when the agencies were generally in an upswing of activity and support
after the quieter (somnolent?) Eisenhower period. The SEC was particularly exciting; its landmarks were the Special Study,' Cady, Roberts,' and
the 1964 Amendments.4 But the book is neither a history nor a legal analysis, although it has elements of both. It is essentially a political essay. Nor
is it limited to the SEC. The CAB, FCC, FPC, FTC, ICC, and various departments are discussed from time to time. But the SEC is, naturally, the
center of attention.
As the title indicates, the agencies are studied in their political setting,
particularly in relation to the White House and the Congress. The discussion of appointments, hearings, budgets, policies, and operations is frank
and revealing. Cary's appraisal of the independence of the agencies is best
stated in his own words: "In fact, government regulatory agencies are stepchildren whose custody is contested by both Congress and the Executive,
but without very much affection from either one." 5 Chapters 1 and 2 give
the pros and cons of "oversight" and a number of intriguing examples of
the ways agencies react to subtle and unsubtle pressures from the legislative
and the executive bodies.
Students of the administrative process will be most interested in chapter 3, which considers why agencies atrophy and how they can be rejuvenated, in terms of people, practices, finances, and ideas. For example, the
"balanced" commission, representing diverse political and economic viewpoints, is desirable in theory and perhaps useful for quasi-judicial decisions,
but tends to inhibit innovation. Cary examines the degree to which agencies (both federal and state) may become "captives" of the industries with
which they deal. Then, he notes, there is the tendency to overjudicialize,
handling existing cases at the expense of formulating basic programs and
policies. Much of this ground has been covered before, but rarely from
such a good vantage point.
'In the corporate field, his writings include a leading casebook, R. BAKER & W. CARY, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON

CORPORATIONS

(3d ed. 1959).

2 REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE

S.E.C. (6 vols. 1963-1964).

aln re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
4 Securities Act Amendments of 1964, 78 Stat. 565 (1964).
5P. 8. See also p. 27, noting that, in Congress, the stress is on agency independence from the
White House.
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Securities lawyers, as well as political historians, will find chapter 4 highly informative. It describes the conception, lobbying (by industry and
government forces), modification and eventual passage of the Securities
Acts Amendments of 1964. I can think of no better behind-the-scenes account of this, or any other piece of major SEC legislation. Also valuable
is the discussion of the Cady, Roberts case as an illustration of one of the
ways (e.g., in addition to rule-making) that an agency develops law and
policy.
Cary's other important beliefs about the agencies appear throughout the
book, but especially in chapter 5. Policy making is a basic part of their
job. Judicial functions should not be split off. Revitalization best comes
from within. Changes by legislation are preferable to those by presidential
reorganization plan. A "czar" for the agencies is undesirable. The agencies
should retain such independence as they have, but they must be continually
aware of their political environment. This awareness requires them to conform to the broad policies of the incumbent administration.
This reasoned, informed, and perceptive book is a significant contribution to realpolitilz of the administrative agencies. It should be read by all
who deal with the agencies, or carp about them.

Alan R. Bromberg*

THE GOVERNANCE

OF MEDIAEVAL

ENGLAND FROM THE

CONQUEST TO MAGNA CARTA. By H. G.
SAYLES.

RICHARDSON

& G. 0.

Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 1963. Pp. ix, 514. 70s.

LAW AND LEGISLATION FROM AETHELBERHT TO MAGNA
CARTA. By H. G. RICHARDSON & G. 0. SAYLES. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 1966. Pp. vii, 201. 50s.
ENGLISH LAW AND LEGISLATION IN THE
ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CENTURIES
Richardson and Sayles are well acquainted with legal and related documents of mediaeval English history. Though neither is a lawyer,' their ad* A.B., Harvard University; LL.B., Yale University. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. Past Chairman, Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law, State Bar of Texas;
Chairman, Committee on Securities and Investment Banking, State Bar of Texas.
' Henry G. Richardson, F.B.A., is former Secretary of the Tithe Redemption Commission.
George 0. Sayles, F.B.A., is former Burnett Fletcher Professor of History, University of Aberdeen,
and was the Kenan Professor of History, New York University, in 1967. Likewise, Professor
Plucknett was not a lawyer, in spite of his LL.B. and the fact that he was a member of the law
faculties of both Harvard and London Universities. See Milsom, Theodore Frank Thomas Plucknetl 1897-1965, 51 PROC. BRIT. ACADEMY 505, 506, 509, 511 (1965). Nor were Vinogradoff
and Stubbs, "whose handling of law Maitland admired so much that he almost wished he had
been a judge." T. PLUCKNETT, EARLY ENGLISH LEGAL LITERATURE 14 (1958). See also id. at
15-16. On Maitland's brief practice at the bar, see id. at 6-8. In commenting on Maitland's
inaugural lecture of 1888 Plucknett had this to say: "Deep at the roots of the question [Why
the history of English law had not been written?], Maitland found certain irreconcilable contradictions which make it especially hard for a man trained exclusively in English law to become
a historian. In the first place, English law was isolated from every other study and was traditionally
taught at the Inns . . . . Then there is the pseudo-historicity of our law. . . . [Wie have to
invoke [Maitland's] fundamental distinction between legal and historical method [that the
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vocacy of conclusions with respect to various historical documents is more
in the tradition of the bar than of a chair of history. In 1963 the Edinburgh University Press brought out their The Governance of Mediaeval

England from the Conquest to Magna Carta. Its sequel, Law and Legislation from Aethelberht to Magna Carta, appeared three years later. We have
waited to review both together.
The Governance of Mediaeval England is not a comprehensive history of
the period, but an episodic and topical commentary. Compared to the
earlier and later work of the authors, it is very uneven. There are passages
of careful synthesis and real eloquence, but there are long stretches of
desert as well, especially in the opening chapters. Though their criticisms
of Stubbs, Round and others are generally well taken, some of their own
conclusions are, it seems to me, as open to criticism. What they sometimes
refer to as "evidence" is nothing more than speculation. Indeed, if their
persistent citation of their own writings in the second volume may be characterized as auto-beatification, this first work may be said, with somewhat
more justice, to constitute the decanonization of Stubbs!
For the general reader and the lawyer, the second book is decidedly the
better and should be read first. I will therefore direct my primary attention
to it, weaving related material from the first volume into my discussion.
The authors have deliberately directed the second and thinner book to the
Ctmany who would not in the ordinary course open a book of legal history."' Although it is not directed at "the minutiae of the law,"' the authors occasionally indulge themselves in minutiae rather vigorously. However, they move their story along without the interruptions encountered in
the first volume that might better have been treated as appendices. No
final analysis of these books, which may very well be the most controversial
contribution to legal history of the last half-century, will be possible until
all the documents which the authors re-analyze have been reassessed by
others in the light of these studies. Time does not permit a restudy of the
documents for this review. It is necessary, therefore, merely to summarize
the authors' conclusions with which legally trained readers will be most interested.'
In Law and Legislation the reader is given a thorough look at the scanty
remains of English legislation up to the reign of Henry III. The remains are
so scanty, in fact, that the authors are able to sketch the whole foundation
lawyer wants authority regardless of its history, whereas the historian wants evidence]. Once the
professor of law embarks upon legal history he has become a historian, for legal history is not
law, but history. And so the legal historian commits no trespass in the pleasant fields of history
-he
is treading his own soil . . . . It is still too often said that English law can only be
understood historically. Now English law may be bad, but is it really as bad as that?" Id. at
11-12, 14, 17.
aBy the time their next volume appears their invective against Stubbs may have finally stilled.
In LAW AND LEGISLATION Stubbs is criticized at several points, but in measured and moderate
language. The SELECT CHARTERS is even cited with apparent respect at times.
' LAW AND LEGISLATION vii.

4 Id.

'For the legal reader the most significant sections of TiiE GOVERNANCE OF MEDIAEVAL ENGLAND are those parts of chapters IV and V dealing with feudalism and the Conquest, chapters IX
and X on the judiciature, chapter XIV on Henry II and the last three chapters on John. Since the
volume is not a continuous narrative, skipping through the book does not present serious difficulties.
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of pre-Norman, English law back to the legislation of the old Kentish kingdom of the sixth century. The Kentish legislation, which was concerned almost exclusively with the criminal law (and a little procedural law as
well), receives a full examination. The authors are careful to point out
that land law, which provided so much of the content of legislation after
the Conquest, is not mentioned in the earliest surviving Kentish legislation.
But status had a significant place, particularly that of women. It appears
that the Christian conception of marriage was unknown to the legislators,
as marriage seems to have been a matter of purchase, "even marriage by
capture seems a distinct possibility. There is no thought of marriage as an
indissoluble union. Separation-we can hardly call it divorce-is a matter
of monetary compensation, and so is adultery."' The Kentish conception of
crime, as well, was for the most part in terms of "wrong-doing to be redeemed with money, though in [some of] the most serious ...cases ...
the penalty may be forfeiture."' With the coming of Christianity, new
delicts and penalties came into the law. Some were ecclesiastical, like excommunication for adultery. There is also a place in the later Kentish law
for social legislation,' and the earliest English legislation for the regulation
of coinage also dates from this period.
Among the early English kings the authors have the highest regard for
Edgar (d. 975), but his reign was not distinguished for its legislation. The
few remains of the legislation of Ethelred (978-1016), however, contain
some significant fragments.! There is little that is new in Cnut's code (c.
1020), and his Danish and English successors, we are told, promulgated no
new laws at all. Williams I and II were no legislators either. "The Normans
were without learning, without literature, without written law.""8 At first,
at least, they were content to leave English institutions as they found them.
The first law book of any consequence after the Conquest is, of course,
the so-called Leges Henrici. Like so much of the previous law, it is strongly
' LAW AND

7

Id. at

LEGISLATION

4.

10.

'In the reign of Athelstan (925-939) there is a remarkable quantity of legislation among
which are laws for the relief of the poor.
' For example, separate sets of laws were made up for those parts of England under English
law and those under the Danelaw. Included in the latter were tle "well-known articles providing
for a court . . . with a body of twelve thegns to act as jury both of presentment and trial. Though
there has been reluctance to admit any connection between these . . . articles and the English
jury of post-Conquest times, the intention of the legislation for the Danelaw seems as a whole
to be so plainly the extension to it of English institutions that there can hardly be room for the
supposition that in this one particular the intention is to preserve a Norse Custom and not to
introduce an English institution." LAW AND LEGISLATION 25. There are many who would vigorously dispute this judgment. E.g., T. BAKER, THE NORMANS 62 (1966), McKnight, Book Review,
21 Sw. L.J. 880 (1967). In their treatment of the assizes of Henry II, our authors again insist
on the Englishness of the jury principle, relying on van Caenegem. But in their view of the civil
or popular jury, they may go further than van Caenegem himself. R. VAN CAENEGEM, ROYAL
WRITS IN ENGLAND FROM THE CONQUEST TO GLANVILL 69-81 (1959). Not Stubbs but Brunner, Round and others bear the brunt of our authors' general discussion of the origin of the
English jury. They find a prima facie case against the Norman origin of the jury in the fact of
its preoccupation with oath taking. In matters of law tse English, our authors feel, were as much
addicted to oaths as the Normans were not. Within twenty years of the Conquest, Richardson
and Sayles find the Normans using not only the jury trial but a process of attaint. "That this
advanced procedure was a recent introduction by the Norman king and was without roots in the

Old English past defies
all probability: where is the Norman parallel to be found?" THE GovERNANCE

OF MEDIAEVAL

10LAW AND

ENGLAND

LEGISLATION

30.

208.
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concerned with criminal law, though it says nothing of "the summons of
the eyre, of presentments and verdicts."'" Since this book contains little that
would be useful to a judge or his clerk, Richardson and Sayles doubt that
it is the work of one of the king's justices." The authors conclude that the
principal interest of the composer of the Leges Henrici was the local courts,
though they doubt that the book was ever of great practical use. But in
their earlier volume, the authors note how vigorous the local (i.e., nonroyal) courts were in this period."
The Quadripartus,of the same general period (c. 1110-1120), incorporates what Richardson and Sayles regard as the one genuine piece of legislation of William I. It is found in the well-known Ten Articles, the main
source of which is found in the Instituta Cnuti, which our authors also
place as originating in the same period (c. 1103-1120). Included in the
Ten Articles is that rather startling provision for the abolition of capital
punishment. Knowing what we do of the Conqueror, it is extremely difficult to attribute this to him." In the view of our authors, then, substantial
parts of the Ten Articles are fiction. And they take the same view of the
Leis Willelme, which they place early in the reign of Henry II. The invention of the Leges Edwardi Confessoris is put late in the reign of Henry I.
But the authors do not underestimate the importance of the Instituta
Cnuti or the Leges Edwardi Confessoris, both of which were later used by
Bracton. The Ten Articles enjoyed "an adventitious success because it
travelled down the centuries with this companion [the Leges Edwardi Confessoris] and it attained the crowning glory of inclusion in the Select Charters as the 'Statutes of William the Conqueror.' ....
The chapter which I most admire is that devoted to the apocrypha of
the law, those compilations and fabrications that were turned out in the
twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. Though many will doubtless disagree with Richardson's and Sayles' analysis of the various books and their
dating of many of them, their treatment is both more thorough than that
of Plucknett in his Early English Legal Literature" and his Concise History, " as well as being more readably expounded. Our authors' handling
of the "so-called Assize of Clarendon" is fascinating as well as controversial. As to the Constitutiones de Foresta "of Cnut," which excited such
great interest in Tudor times, they are at a loss to suggest its author or its
purpose, terming it a jeu d'esprit.1" This term is also applied to the Ten
Articles, the Leis Willelme, the Assize of Clarendon, and the Assize of
Id. at 44.
I1
1 It is strikingly different from that book which goes under the name of GLANVILLE, which
is devoted almost exclusively to the land law-with only a brief appendix on criminal law.
" See THE GOVERNANCE 01' MEDIAEVAL ENGLAND 93.
4
See D. DOUGLAS, WILLIAM THE CONQUEROR 60, 219-21, 371-74 (1967). "And indeed it
would have been strange if the Peterborough chronicler or some other of William's contemporary
-or nearly contemporary-panegyrists had not remarked upon this stroke of uncharacteristic humanity." LAW AND LEGISLATION 47. Although the compilation of Doomsday Book is termed a
"vast administrative mistake," its "lucky survival" is credited with having enhanced the Conqueror's reputation among grateful historians. THE GOVERNANCE OF MEDIAEVAL ENGLAND 28.
Is LAW AND LEGISLATION 48.
1
T. PLUCKNETT, EARLY ENGLISH LEGAL LITERATURE 24-31 (1958).
7
T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 252-58 (5th ed. 1956).
See LAW AND LEGISLATION 128.

"8
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Woodstock. Richardson and Sayles express the hope that their analysis will
terminate the respectability of the apocrypha and "may in some measure
hinder the continuance of their bad work."1
Most of us have begun the study of real property with the doctrine of
feudal tenures." We have been taught that feudal tenures were based on
the rendering of services. A good deal has been made of knight service and
its alleged importance in land holding until the passage of the Statute of
Wills and the ultimate abolition of knight service tenure in 1660. Our authors stress that the use of military tenure achieved little toward the provision of an effective army. In the end, the problem of providing troops
for military purposes defeated the Norman and Angevin kings, and "military tenures ultimately became no more than a means of raising money in
oppressive ways."'" The whole truth, as our authors see it, is that, by the
time "feudal" tenures were introduced into England, they were almost an
anachronism. "The professional soldier, the professional lawyer, 2 the professional civil servant, had made their appearance and were becoming ever
more professional and more necessary: without them, the organized state,
such as England was, would have collapsed." 23
This is not to say that the positive obligations and negative restraints of
liege homage did not have some significance in the twelfth century. But
by the thirteenth century the relationship was essentially an economic one.
There was little thought of rendering actual military service, but those incidents such as relief, homage, marriage and wardship were quite significant. These, our authors point out, were really the theme of the statute
Quia Emptores. Because the mesne tenant encountered little difficulty in
alienating parts of his fee and, therefore, new relationships occurred constantly, " 'the chief lords of fees had many times lost their escheats, marriages and wardships'-there is no word of any other loss. ' ' 4 The strict system of tenures that many of us have been taught to imagine enduring well
into the sixteenth and sometimes the seventeenth century did not really
exist. An accommodation between the "immutable nexus between land
and service and the rapidly evolving conception of property as a means of
gratifying the needs or whims of the possessor"" was achieved through the
agency of money. Thus, when our authors abstract what was essential in
primitive feudal tenures, they are left "with little more than meaningless
'feudal incidents' that endured because they were a source of profit.""
Richardson and Sayles not only question the validity of the feudal so191d. at 131.
2 Apart from some instruction in terminology, using the study of real property as a vehicle
for teaching legal history has been a particularly sterile exercise, from the point of view of both
law and history.
21 THE GOVERNANCE

OF MEDIAEVAL ENGLAND

77.

22The twelfth century seems a bit early for professional lawyers. See T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 216 (5th ed. 1956). See also 5 G. SAYLES, SELECT CASES IN
THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH UNDER EDWARD III, at xxix, xl-xli, lx-lxi (1958), McKnight,

Book Review, 108 PA. L. REV. 934 (1960).
3 THE GOVERNANCE
24
Md. at 112,

OF MEDIAEVAL ENGLAND 115.
citing W. STUBBS, SELECT CHARTERS

OF THE REALM 106 (reprint 1963).
2' THE GOVERNANCE OF MEDIAEVAL ENGLAND

sId. at 115.

113.

473

(2d

ed.

1874),

and

1 STATUTES
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ciety which King William is credited with bringing to England, but also
doubt that the Conqueror introduced a new doctrine: that all lands are
held of the king. "There is nothing to suggest that William conceived
himself as asserting a right that did not belong to the Confessor or that the
Old English kings stood in any different relation to their landowning subjects." 27 The Anglo-Norman and Angevin kings, then, maintained their
primacy not because of feudalism but in spite of it."8
Our authors refer to the post-Conquest fyrd as "mythical"'" and regard
the passage of the Ten Articles which makes the Conqueror demand of all
freemen defense of the king's lands and honor as equally fictional beyond
those who held by military tenure. Henry II's Assize of Arms, which gave
freemen alone "the privilege or obligation" of bearing arms, the authors
"unquestionably" place in 1176, thereby rejecting Howden's dating at
1181.m Among the legislative events of John's reign, our authors regard
his Assize of Arms of 1205 as second only in importance to the Great
Charter. This "panic legislation" was issued at a time when invasion by
the French king was anticipated and provided that should this eventuality
occur, all men were to assemble armed. Our authors feel that it could not
have been effective. But this scheme of arming all men at the age of twelve
was resuscitated in 1230, and John's legislation is important in that it
"marks a significant point in the passage of a great part of the population
from unfreedom to freedom.""2 Though there may be garbled spots in their
recounting of the position of the free and unfree in view of the law and
the fact, Richardson and Sayles are probably correct in saying "the unfree
were never so much at the mercy of their lords as legal theory implied.""2
The reforms of Henry I, our authors believe, laid the foundation for the
curious tripartite structuring of the English common law judicial system
which (though mightily rationalized in the late nineteenth century) has
never been wholly put to rest. "Save for the contrivances of a king who
died more than eight centuries ago, there would have been but one central
court, as there was, for example, in France." 2 And there are, to be sure,
other reminiscences of the "greatest of the Norman kings." From time to
time lawyers bewail the infringement of administrative agencies upon the
judicial process. A fact that is not sufficiently appreciated is that our judicial system sprang from what might be called Anglo-Norman and Angevin administrative practice. Though, in the course of the reign of Henry
II, barons and justices tended to specialize, the common bench and the exchequer were not really different tribunals. They were not completely sepat 116.
28The authors point out that a good deal of confusion has grown up from applying the word
"feudal" in the context of jurisdiction as well as that of tenures. But England was not feudal
in the former sense--as the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries ultimately proved. The
thrust of feudalism is, after all, "to diminish by fragmentation lordship as a whole-the authority
of the king and whatever other lords there might be." Id. at 117.
"However, they find some evidence of defensive duty of burgesses in some instances. LAW
17Id.

AND 0 LEGISLATION
3
at 138.

Id.
InId.
32

Id. at 143.
81d. at 33.

3

101.
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arate even in the reign of John, when a general eyre might demand the full
strength of the judiciary and sessions of the bench might be suspended
for a term or two. Differentiation in function and personnel was not
achieved until the office of justiciar was abolished in 1234; then the tripartite division of the courts achieved its ultimate form.34
None of this would have been possible were it not for the remarkable
extent of literacy among the laity in the twelfth century-a fact which
our authors feel has been almost universally doubted or denied. "The secularization of learning-or perhaps literacy would be the better wordmade possible Henry's achievement and gave it permanence.""3 Language
of clerks, officers and courtiers was that of northern France and our authors believe that proceedings in courts of law, including exchequer, were
conducted in that language and "that Latin was a stumbling-block and
was rarely spoken, except when a document was read.""6 Nor did the
king's absence from the realm interrupt judicial and administrative routine. The clerks and the office of the justiciar then issued writs in the justiciar's name." Thus the precursor of the Chancery's writ-issuing function
has a continuous history from the twelfth century.
Though the writ process is traced to the Old English kingdom, the jurisprudence of the early twelfth century and beyond is concerned primarily
with the land law "built up, writ by writ, into a loose series of related, if
ill-defined, forms of action, which were reshaped by the assizes of Henry
II and finally systematized by the anonymous lawyer of genius who gave
us Glanville.""5 In the writ system our authors find no Norman invention
but merely a "clumsy adaptation of English forms by men unskilled in
English ways and the English tongue."3 Our authors doubt that wer, wite
and bot, which had been of great significance before, signified very much
by the early twelfth century. The evolving law of tort took no notice of
them. The office of justiciar itself, created early in the twelfth century, '
had a great influence on the evolution of English administration and also
on that of the writ system.
The authors categorically assert that there is no evidence of direct influence of Roman law upon the law of England before the reign of Henry II.
However, our authors find the impact of Rome beginning at that time.
The "first and foremost lesson" that the Romanists taught was order,
"4THE GOVERNANCE OF MEDIAEVAL ENGLAND 215, 248 n.2. As to the mixed element of
personnel on the two courts, see id. at 250; on the King's Bench, see id. at 213.
asId. at 269. See also id. at 167, 278-79.
36Id. at 278.
"The clerks of the chapel who followed the king were responsible for charters and excep.
tional writs.
a' LAW AND LEGISLATION 49. See also THE GOVERNANCE OF MEDIAEVAL ENGLAND 284.
so LAW AND LEGISLATION $0. Though "nothing has survived that can be connected" with any
of the eyres of Henry I, there may have been civil pleas, by writ or by plaint, as well as pleas of
the crown that foreshadow those standardized under Henry II. THE GOVERNANCE OF MEDIAEVAL
ENGLAND 181.
4 In this regard, see T. PLUCKNETT,

A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 370 n.2
(5th ed. 1956), which calls our attention to the twelfth century custumal of 1 BOROUGH CUSTOMs 30-31 (M. Bateson ed. 1904).
41 Richardson and Sayles put the origin of the institution of the jucticiarship in the reign of
Henry I. For another view, see F. WEST, THE JUSTICIARSHIP IN ENGLAND 1066-1232, at 18-19
(1966).
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which harmonized and reduced to a system a mass of writs, casually and
sporadically invented or modified, that had accumulated over many years.*
This orderly approach to legal institutions was to culminate about 1250 in
our second important textbook, Bracton.
Richardson and Sayles find the influence of Roman law "more certain"
in the development of the action of trespass a than in the development of
novel disseisin, to which most leading authorities until recently have ascribed a canon law origin." They reiterate their views on the origin of trespass so extensively developed in the introduction to their Select Cases of
Procedure Without Writ Under Henry III in 1941. Their view has since
been adopted by Fifoot." But to the last, Plucknett was somewhat wary of
it and blended it with his own view that trespass (or the idea of it) originated in the local courts and was transmitted into the royal courts as the
writs ostensurus quare began to develop in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries." As Plucknett suggests, there really need be no conflict
between his views and those of Richardson and Sayles. But our authors
have stuck to their original position without mention of Plucknett, or
Fifoot.
The traditional view, which can be traced back to Coke and Hawkins
(based presumably on deductions from Bracton, Fleta, Britton and the
Mirror) , was that the action of trespass was developed from the appeals
of felony." Our authors also find a relationship between the origins of trespass and practice with respect to appeals of felony, but they reach this
4' LAW AND LEGISLATION

79.

" In GLANVILLE there is no mention of the action of trespass. Our authors, however, argue
that its direct ancestor begins to appear in the plea rolls referred to as an actio inurianrum, a
phrase still used by Bracton. A fuller discussion on which Richardson and Sayles rely is their
own introduction to H. RICHARDSON & G. SAYLES, SELECT CASES OF PROCEDURE WITHOUT
WRIT UNDER HENRY III, at cviii-cxiii (1941). They feel that the reason for the "inexplicable"
failure of the author of GLANVILLE to speak of the action is the fact that it was then begun
by plaint. Perhaps a better explanation might be that in that author's experience pleading by
plaint may have been irregular or even nonexistent, or that he regarded it as so irregular or so
unusual as not to warrant comment.
4"They have ascribed the origin of the assize of novel disseisin to the canonical action actio
spolii, framed in terms of the Roman interdict unde vi. But our authors point out that "the
actio spolii . . . had not emerged until Henry II and author of Glanville had long been laid to
rest." LAW AND LEGISLATION 82.
4 C. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW-CONTRACT AND TORT 44-54

(1949).
4
'T.

4 See

PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE

H.

RICHARDSON

&

G. SAYLES,

SELECT

COMMON
CASES

LAW 366-72 (5th ed. 1956).

OF PROCEDURE

WITHOUT

WRIT

UNDER

HENRY III, at cviii, n.1 (1941).
" This view was accepted and embellished by Holmes, Ames, Maitland and Holdsworth. One
reason for this insistence on derivation of the action from a widely recognized, formalized proceeding may be found in the statement of GLANVILLE that one need not answer for his lay
fee except in response to the King's writ, 12 GLANVILLE 25 (G. Hall ed. 1965), a statement that
perhaps implies an over-emphasis on writ pleading in general. Another possible reason is that little
consideration was given to non-royal courts in our legal-historical or other legal literature until
comparatively recently. This sole preoccupation with writs, founded on GLANVILLE's ignoring of
non-writ procedures, was not really questioned until W. Bolland's publication of SELECT BILLS
IN EYRE in 1914. There he pointed out that the records indicate that actions were frequently
commenced without writ, although the mediaeval writers from GLANVILLE onward had seemed to
ignore this fact in an effort, perhaps, to achieve uniformity through stressing the necessity of
writ practice. As van Caenegem points out, "A picture of the legal system of any society
gathered from theoretical sources only is liable to be misleading. Legal practice is often a great
distance away from legal texts in theory ....
The actual cases which accorded with the scheme
of things described in the law books were a minority." R. VAN CAENEGEM, ROYAL WRITS IN
ENGLAND

FROM THE CONQUEST

TO

GLANVILLE

41

(1959).
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conclusion in a rather different way than those before them who had not
mined the underlying material nearly so deeply or so thoroughly. In its
essentials their conclusions may be boiled down to those constituents underlying the traditional view as Fifoot summarized them: (1) the linguistic
similarity of language of the appeal and the later developed writ of trespass, (2) the semi-criminal character of trespass, and (3) the inadequacy
of the appeal as a remedy in that damages were not recoverable through
it.
Professor Woodbine's objections to the first and second points are refuted. With regard to the third, Fifoot observes that "inadequacy of the
appeal may be confessed, but the conclusion drawn avoided .... Post hoc,
even in legal history, is not propter hoc."'" In this regard it would seem
that Fifoot did not fully appreciate the arguments which Richardson and
Sayles offered in 1941, or chose to mellow them without saying so. Richardson and Sayles point out that one need not confess the long asserted
view that damages were in no way related to the appeals since proceeding
without writ to claim damages used much of the language of the appeals.
Although they cite twenty odd instances from the plea rolls of the period,
they do not demonstrate that these actions claiming damages were pursued to a successful conclusion." It is in these formless complaints-some
written, some oral-that they find the origin of the action of trespass. But as
Plucknett points out, this finding does not necessarily demonstrate the origin of the action. As he puts it, "The origin of trespass . . . is part of the
larger question of origin of all the actions which were directed against a defendant who had done damage to a plaintiff. The original writ in all these
cases is in the same form ostensurus quare, and origin of that form is the
real root of the matter."" Though he can only speculate as to the origin of
the idea that wrongs in the nature of trespass gave rise to recovery, he concludes that this idea must have been prevalent in the local courts, which indeed were the only courts available for recoveries in general prior to the development of the Anglo-Norman royal courts in the mid-twelfth century.
But Richardson and Sayles remain unmoved by Plucknett's argument. 2
Though it is no inconsequential fact "that the judicial system of the
thirteenth century was, in its essentials, already in being under Henry II,"
an organized judiciary in the thirteenth century sense had scarcely been
achieved on the resumption of the general eyres in 116 6 ." At a council
4
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AND

TORT

44-54

(1949).
5o H. RICHARDSON & G. SAYLES, SELECT CASES OF PROCEDURE WITHOUT WRIT UNDER HENRY
III,at cviii-cxxviii (1941). Their language at cxix may not be of general reference in this regard, but they seem to appreciate this difficulty. Their pleas (Nos. 38 and 31 from 1227 and
1267, at 59-60 and 45-46) closely approach this result. But unsuccessful efforts toward recovery
based on pleading by analogy to existing forms may be nothing more than blind alleys of legal
development. See, e.g., Fifoot's discussion of experiments in the nature of actions for deceit in the
evolution of assumpsit. C. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW-CONTRACT
AND TORT 332-34 (1949).
51T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 370 (5th ed. 1956).
" However, they have recognized the complexity of the early history of the action of trespass:
"To look for a single strand to guide us from the clarity of the fourteenth century to the obscurity of the twelfth would be to mistake the nature of the problem." H. RICHARDSON & G.
SAYLES, SELECT CASES OF PROCEDURE WITHOUT WRIT UNDER HENRY III,at cxxviii (1941).
See also id.cxxv-cxxvi, cxxxii.
"STHE GOvERNANCE OF MEDIAEVAL ENGLAND 212.
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held at Clarendon in the winter of 1165-1166, a series of measures for the
suppression of crime and the reform of the land law appear to have been
adopted and received their definitive form in a council at Northampton
in 1176. It was here that the assize of novel disseisin was devised, after
long hours of deliberation and not copied from a canonical model, which
in fact did not exist.' But beyond this our authors do not attribute to the
Assize of Clarendon the importance which Stubbs and his followers have
given it. If Richardson and Sayles are right in their conception of the
events of 1166, the Assize of Clarendon did not institute or establish the
principle of the grand jury," and they are certain that the eyre of 1166
proceeding under the Assize of Clarendon failed generally in its immediate
purpose of insuring that its decrees would be promptly and readily obeyed.
The authors also reinterpret some other aspects of the reign of Henry
II. In the preoccupation of the Leges Edwardi Confessoris"'with prerogatives and privileges of the crown is found a deliberate effort to buttress the
objectives and aspirations of Henry II. Though William of Newburgh's
allegation that in nine years, more than a hundred unpunished murders (as
well as other serious crimes) had been committed by men in holy orders
is dismissed as a fabrication concocted long after the fact, our authors find
clear justification for Henry's irritation with the school of thought adhered
to by Becket and others that criminous clerks should not be subject to
secular jurisdiction. In both volumes the juxtaposition of temperaments of
Henry and Becket is scarcely that described by Anouilh or by Eliot. Henry
is seen as "a difficult-man to live with; a serious, studious, frugal man, at
a time when frivolity, lavishness, extravagance were the means of conquering the hearts and commanding the goodwill of youth. . . . There
were few contemporaries with the perspicacity to set the king's achievements above his errors and oddities, his failures and defects."'" In our authors' view, Henry's greatest mistake was in choosing and trusting "the
flashy, shallow, and egotistic Thomas Becket,' 5 a choice made by a young
and inexperienced man on the reliance of the judgment of the old and experienced Archbishop Theobald.
"4H. RICHARDSON & G. SAYLES, SELECT CASES OF PROCEDURE WITHOUT WRIT UNDER HENRY
III, at cxxx (1941). Our authors also purport to find early twelfth century antecedents of the
basic principle underlying novel disseisin. LAW AND LEGISLATION 83. See also R. VAN CAENEGEM,
ROYAL WRITS
"

IN
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271-83

(1959).

The major argument, though by no means the only argument, for the antiquity of
the accusing jury seems to us to be the close resemblance-we had almost said the
identity-between the general eyres of Henry II and those of Henry I. It is hard
to believe that there was any substantial difference between the presentment and trial
of criminals over the thirty or forty years that intervene . . . . The only possible
alternative to our hypothesis is that under Henry I juries, sworn ad hoc, already
represented the hundreds before the itinerant justices. That the function of presenting criminals was then performed in one way or the other, either by the judices

or by specially sworn juratores, cannot reasonably be doubted.
THE GOVERNANCE OF MEDIAEVAL ENGLAND 207.
" Our authors consider this the first significant utterance on English constitutional law and
date it in the early years of the reign of Henry Il. See LAW AND LEGISLATION 57.
57 THE GOVERNANCE OF MEDIAEVAL ENGLAND 268. The authors point out that Henry was

scarcely the fashionable model
form, and it may well be that
Id. at 267-68.
58id. at 267. The authors
good and John as all bad. Id.

of the French noble "to which Henry's sons endeavored to conin this we should see the source of their enmity with their father."
complain of Stubbs' characterization of Archbishop Langton as all
at 337. Here they might fall under the same sort of criticism.
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An analysis of the relation of church and state during the twelfth century and the struggle for jurisdiction between Henry II and Becket is fully treated in the first volume. Our authors conclude that a sensible settlement which both canonists and laymen could accept was clearly available.
But, as Gilbert Foliot reminded Henry forcibly, "Becket was not sensible."
As far as the rank and file of the clergy were concerned, whether it was
a secular or ecclesiastical tribunal that decided a dispute in which churchmen found themselves "mattered very little, so long as they won."5 But
however absurd the violence of the dispute with regard to criminous clerks
may appear to us, it did not so appear to contemporaries. Our authors conclude that Henry's handling of the controversy compares unfavorably
with John's much more astute disposition of his not very dissimilar problem with Archbishop Langton." Richardson and Sayles rather blandly
conclude that the Becket fracas is important merely as a test of strength
between England and Rome (having some significance in the long range
relationship of those powers), but, with respect to jurisdiction and its immediate effect on the shape of the criminal law, its significance has been
very considerably exaggerated. The controversy did not deflect Henry
"more than momentarily from his course or materially affect ...relations
between Church and State." 1
Richardson and Sayles begin their discussion of the reign of John by
putting right various tales and fantasies with respect to his marriages. As
for John's evil reputation, it was well based and well known in his own
time, despite efforts of some modern historians to rehabilitate it." But the
shrewd side of his character, "which historians have recently discovered
with rather naive surprise, his contemporaries took for granted."' Putting
aside John's personal faults, which do not differ remarkably from those of
the other actors of the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, "the
major count against John is that he was not prudent or considerate enough
to live on good terms with his barons and that he provoked them to civil
war over an issue not worth armed conflict.""4 With respect to the effects
of the papal interdicts under which John's, as well as Richard's, domins LAW AND LEGISLATION

62.

00The authors point out that "John smothered his resentment and took his stand upon the

established law, quite plainly stated in the twelfth article of the Constitutions of Clarendon, that
vacant churches were to be filled with the king's assent and by the advice of those he should
appoint for the purpose." LAW AND LEGISLATION 70. They go on to state that the law of 1164

for which John contended
ment (id. at 63) that an
is puzzling. The reference
1953, 1 & 2 Eliz. 2, No.

is still the law today. In the light of this statement, a related comadvowson "remained until very recent years" an interest in property
is presumably to the Benefices (Suspension of Presentation) Measure,
5, and previous measures of a like kind in 1946 and 1949 which are

consolidated therein with amendments. See 33 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 47-54 (2d ed.

1953). Within the past year Magdalen College, Oxford, made an appointment of the living of
Ashton Tinold upon Ashton Upthorpe, Berks.
1 THE GOVERNANCE OF MEDIAEVAL ENGLAND 268.
02 In reviewing, D. STENTON, ENGLISH JUSTICE BETWEEN THE NORMAN CONQUEST AND THE
GREAT CHARTER (1964), Richardson says that "her tenderness for . . . king [John] has sometimes led her astray." Richardson, Book Review, 75 YALE L.J. 1076 (1966). Lady Stenton is
not quite as gentle in her review of LAW AND LEGISLATION, particularly with regard to our
authors' handling of the pre-Conquest materials. Stenton, Book Review, 67 COLUM. L. REV.
1341

(1967).

" THE GOVERNANCE OF MEDIAEVAL

"Id.

at 394.

ENGLAND

379.

1968 ]

BOOK REVIEWS

ions lay during much of their reigns, the treatment is full and fascinating,
laying the groundwork that leads up to the events culminating in the
Great Charter.
Our authors close both volumes with the discussion of the Great Charter. In spite of their other revisionist views, they are not debunkers of
Magna Carta. They point out that the document is, of course, of greater
political than of legal interest. They term it essentially a compromised
action. The reforms that were demanded were reasonable ones, fully justified by experience, "and not the experience of the rule of John alone." 5 In
the evolution of English legislative forms, the Charter earns its high place in
the course of English political development because it reflected an attitude
toward public affairs that was of outstanding historical significance and to
which no earlier parallel can be found. The authors find as a partial cause
for the changed attitude between 1174 and 1215 the personal wrongs of
John, and the exploitation of oppressive customs by John, his father and
his brother. But to say that the influence of Langton transferred the selfish
revolt of the barons "to a higher plane .. .is against [what little] evidence" there is." Our authors find a changed political climate induced by
Henry II's strong central administration and a system of uniform law. The
growing awareness of Roman law, they feel, also promoted an attitude toward law as a rational system, although it is as unlikely that John's opponents knew "the sources from which their political ideas were derived as
modern politicians are unlikely to know the sources of political ideas they
take for granted." '
The Charter was indeed a hasty draft to meet urgent needs, and it was
revised several times before it reached its final form in 1225. But because
it was something out of the ordinary (a first of its kind) "it became a
symbol and assumed mystic properties. It became the symbol of the rule of
law, the vindication of the right of the barons to maintain the law and
be consulted on changes in the law."" s It took another century, however,
for it to become integrated into the general law and to become impossible
of being undone. Thus our authors close their studies of England from the
Conquest to the Magna Carta, expressing the most provocative views on
the legal history of that period in this century.
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